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I.

Introduction
The Egyptian people have monopolized the water of the Nile River for more than

5000 years. Greek historian Herodotus famously referred to Egypt as the ‘gift of the
river’ as its civilization grew and prospered on the Nile’s fertile banks.3 Unchallenged
access to the Nile allowed Egypt to emerge as the ‘breadbasket of the Roman Empire’
and has been a driving factor in its historic regional hegemony.4 In the late nineteenth
century, Great Britain came to be the colonial power in the region, controlling both Egypt
and its contiguous upstream neighbor, Sudan. The British sought to guarantee that these
countries, particularly Egypt, had unchallenged access to the Nile’s discharge to maintain
their significant agricultural exports.5 This exclusivity was finally recorded in a 1929
agreement between the two countries that gave Egypt the right to utilize 48 billion cubic
meters (bcm) and Sudan the right to 4 bcm of the assumed total flow of 52 bcm.6 More
importantly, the entire flow of the Nile during the dry season was to be reserved for
Egypt; it would also have veto power over any upstream development projects.
After the construction of the Aswan High Dam (AHD) during the Cold War, the
amount of water that could be captured increased and a new, post-colonial agreement
between Egypt and Sudan was signed in 1959. This allocated 55.5 bcm for Egypt and
15.5 bcm for Sudan, with an assumed 10 bcm lost to evaporation from Lake Nasser, the

3
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dam’s reservoir.7 There were no other signatories to this 1959 agreement as most of the
other riparian states were still under colonial rule. In effect, a prevailing status quo was
established which disregarded the rights of upstream nations and people to develop their
share of the Nile in a way that might harm Egypt’s determined water allocation.
Until recently, the rights set forth by the 1959 agreement provided Egypt with a
surplus of water to provide for its relatively small population and to irrigate its farms. The
Egyptian economy and population became heavily dependent on the growth and export of
agricultural products fed by the Nile’s waters; the country currently utilizes between 8085 percent of their allocation of the Nile’s water for irrigation purposes. However, this
surplus has gradually dwindled. Fifty years ago the country had 2,100 cubic meters of
water per person, which was well over the 1000 cubic meter per person water ‘poverty
line’ as outlined by the United Nations.8 Today, the average water allowance in Egypt is
less than 800 cubic meters per person.9 This precipitous drop is largely due to the
significant increase in Egypt’s population from about 26 million in 1960 to over 83
million today with a projection of 114.8 million before its stabilizes in 2065.10. The
historical access to excess water has led to an inefficient water irrigation system, a
bloated and ineffective water bureaucracy, unwise strategic efforts to irrigate desert land,
and other egregious and wasteful policies. It is widely recognized that Egypt is in the

7
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midst of a water crisis. Riots and headlines about water shortages are rife in today’s
newspapers.
The sustainability of these internal inefficiencies and the ensuing wastage had not
been threatened until recently; however, there are now mounting signs that the status quo
has begun to unravel. Egypt faces dwindling regional power resulting from the fall of the
Mubarak regime and increasing pressure from upstream riparian states, or the countries
bordering the river, to develop an equitable water-sharing agreement.

In 2010, six

upstream nations signed the Entebbe Treaty, which asserted that they would no longer
ask Egypt’s permission to divert water for their own use. Not surprisingly, Egypt, Sudan
and South Sudan, which gained independence in 2011, are not signatories. Ethiopia,
which contributes significantly more water to the river’s annual flow than any other
country, has emerged as the most vocal proponent of capitalizing on its national right to
use the Nile’s waters. In April 2011, Ethiopia announced plans to construct the $5 billion
Grand Renaissance Dam (GRD), which will be the largest hydroelectric power generator
in Africa and create one of Africa’s largest reservoirs; it will also significantly reduce the
flow of water reaching Egypt’s borders. 11
Although Egypt is the riparian state most dependent on the waters of the Nile,
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Egypt will not be able to stop the
construction of the GRD using its typical methods of political and military coercion, and
Ethiopia’s population could greatly benefit from the export of hydroelectric power and
the increased food security that would result from the irrigation of underutilized arable
land. Ethiopia will pursue the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam and Egypt
11
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must take action to prepare for this certain reduction in its water supply. Egypt faces
immense economic and political challenges to provide for its growing population in the
face of decreasing food security, urban crowding and climate change. The current
inefficient use of water is arguably the most crucial environmental and development
problem in Egypt.12
This paper will discuss water rights diplomacy in the Nile Basin, the roots of the
water crisis in Egypt and the capability of upstream riparian states, particularly Ethiopia,
to utilize their share of the Nile. It will propose alternatives solutions to remedy the
conflicting claims to the Nile water without a regional devolution into war. Current
water use trends in Egypt will be outlined including an analysis of supply and demand
issues, distributional and institutional failures, and property rights problems that have led
to an inefficient use of water. Other water use policies will be discussed including
inefficiencies in the existing infrastructure, cropping patterns, evaporation, etc.
This paper will argue that the likelihood of a regional clash over water will be
significantly reduced if Egypt reforms its water management and irrigation policies to
yield greater water usage efficiencies and savings, thus avoiding a shortage when
upstream development projects are implemented. The analysis of the Egyptian agriculture
and irrigation sectors will conclude with a recommendation for a reform emphasizing the
transfer of water management control to a more localized level. It will be essential to
learn lessons from Mexico’s implementation of the most successful irrigation reform in
the world by delegating power to Water Users Associations (WUAs). These communitybased groups create effective incentives, largely through the creation of an efficient
12
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economic market for the resource, for local farmers to adopt water saving tactics. Similar
to Egypt, the Mexican government agency in charge of water distribution and pricing was
extremely centralized and exhibited rent-seeking behavior, thereby lacked the
institutional capacity to implement water saving policies. This case will be examined and
analyzed as an approach that could be utilized by the Egyptian government to implement
policy that reflects the need for sustainable water use, efficiency and conservation. It
appears that with successful reform, as illustrated by the Mexican case, water wastage
will be decreased and the efficiency of the irrigation sector will be significantly increased
from the current operating levels.

II.

The Geography of the Nile Basin
The Nile is the world’s longest river measuring 4,200 miles from its source in

Tanzania to its mouth along Egypt’s Mediterranean coast.13 The Nile flows from south to
north and travels through the borders of Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, (DRC), Rwanda, Eritrea, Burundi, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt
– the most downstream state. About 85 percent of the Nile’s waters originate in Ethiopia’s
tributaries, the Blue Nile and the Atbara, whose discharge is only accessible to the
downstream countries. The other 15 percent of the water comes from the White Nile
which originates in Burundi. The Blue Nile meets the White Nile in Khartoum, Sudan;
they converge with the Atbara shortly thereafter. But despite its significant contribution to
the discharge of the River, Ethiopia’s use of the river has been negligible due to Egyptian
hegemony and internal strife. Ethiopia is the upstream country that could benefit most
13
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from increased access to these resources due to low levels of development, the
underutilization of arable land and enormous hydroelectric potential. Egypt is the riparian
state that is most dependent on the Nile as 97 percent of its water comes from the river;
the other 3 percent comes from ground water, recycled water and rain water. Additionally,
around 75 million of the Egypt’s 80 million people live in the delta and river valley.14 The
water dependence situation is similar in Sudan; however, Sudan’s agriculture sector is less
developed and therefore requires less water. This dependence is a stark contrast from some
upstream countries, such as the DRC, for which the Nile is a minuscule part of their water
resources. Most of the upstream countries lie in the ‘Great Lakes Region’ where the
rainfall contributes substantially to water resources. The total population of the Nile Basin
countries is 300 million of which 100 million live on less than $1 day.15 With the
exception of Egypt and Kenya, the other nine Nile Basin countries are classified as ‘leastdeveloped’ by the United Nations.16 The size of the Basin population is expected to
balloon in the coming decades; it is predicted that the populations of Ethiopia, Sudan and
Egypt alone will reach 340 million by 2050.17

III.

Egypt’s Hegemony with Respect to Water Rights
For the past 5000 years, the Egyptians have been the regional hegemon and have

enjoyed unchallenged access to the Nile. Though Egyptians have always utilized the
Nile’s fertile basin for agricultural purposes, the country’s productivity, specifically in the
14

Pearce, Fred. "Does Egypt Own The Nile? A Battle Over Precious Water." Yale Environment 360. N.p.,
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15
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cotton industry, significantly increased under British colonial rule. This was due to their
investment in water storage, including the first Aswan Dam, and transportation
infrastructure to facilitate the export of agricultural products.18 During this period, the
British also began to cultivate small industries in Sudan. In 1929, in order to solidify the
water rights of these two countries, the British signed a water-sharing agreement between
the two countries at a ratio of 12:1 favoring Egypt.19
In 1952, at the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union financed Egypt’s
AHD, making it the first significant development project on the river and considerably
increasing the amount of discharge captured. In response to this power play, Ethiopia’s
Emperor Hailie Selassie commissioned the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to implement a
survey on the irrigation and hydropower potential on its share of the Blue Nile before it
reached Egypt’s borders. The resulting report identified twenty areas with potential to
produce hydro-electric power and five million acres of arable land whose utilization
would require 6% of the Nile’s water before it reached Egypt’s borders.20 As John
Waterbury writes, “Egypt may have its Soviet-financed dam, but Ethiopia has Egypt’s
water.”21 Despite the clear potential for its own development, the culmination of this
analysis was the construction of a single dam in Ethiopia in 1972; further construction was
halted due to internal stride.22
In 1959, in order to solidify their respective historic rights to the water, a treaty
entitled “Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters” was signed between
18
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Sudan and Egypt to divide this additional water. The AHD allowed for the complete
exploitation of the Nile and increased the annual discharge by 32 bcm from the 1929
estimate. This increase was allocated at a 2:1 ratio between Egypt and Sudan.23 Despite
the fact that Ethiopia was no longer under Italian rule, it was not included in negotiations.
The agreement vaguely addressed the potential threat of upstream riparians and indicated
that Sudan and Egypt should jointly decide on a response to threatening development
projects.24 This new agreement defined water-sharing in absolute terms; John Waterbury
writes, “it constructed a classic zero-sum situation; ceteris paribus, any gain in water to
an upstream riparian must be a loss to Egypt and the Sudan.”25 The control of the Nile by
Egypt and Sudan is unique in comparison to other riparian arrangements as it gives
complete control of the water to the downstream states; typically upstream countries
control the resource and develop their portion of the river at the expense of downstream
countries.26
Until recently, Egypt did not face any direct threats to the rights set forth by the
1959 treaty. As Waterbury et al. point outs, this arrangement was not contested by
upstream riparians due to “Cold War rivalries, their own political instability combined
with bouts of civil war, and their feeble economies did not allow… [them] to press any
realistic claim to Nile Water arising in or traversing their territories.”27 For example, in
1974, a coupe in Ethiopia brought to power Colonel Mengistu Meriam who allied with

23

Ibid, 289.
Waterbury, John, and Dale Whittington. "Playing Chicken on the Nile? The Implications of Microdam
Development in the Ethiopian Highlands and Egypt's New Valley Project." Middle Eastern Natural
Environmental 103 (n.d.): 150-66. Print, 151.
25
Waterbury, "Is the Status Quo in the Nile Basin Viable?”, 291.
26
Rahaman, Muhammed. "Principles of International Water Law: Creating Effective Transboundary Water
Resources Management." International Journal of Sustainable Society 1.3 (2009): 207-23. Print, 209
27
Waterbury and Whittington, “Playing Chicken on the Nile?” 151.

24

8

the Soviets; at the same time, Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat began to ally with Western
forces. Ethiopia lost the Western support and funding to develop their portion of the river
based on the outcome of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation survey.28 Additionally, Ethiopia
went to war with Somalia and internal civil war with Eritrean rebels; there was also
severe economic crisis in Sudan. This gave Egypt unchallenged access to the Nile’s water
for the foreseeable future; as Waterbury point out, the only constraints were “those
created by its own profligate use of water in its existing agriculture system.”29
Waterbury points to Egypt’s vested interest in the destabilization of its upstream
neighbors as exemplified by their support of the National Islamic Front in Sudan.

30

Waterbury points out that as long as they are in power, “the Sudan will be an ‘outlaw’
state, cut off from the international credits that would allow it to press ahead with its
hydraulic plans.”31 Additionally, Egypt has enjoyed significant influence in bi- and multilateral donor agencies.32 For example, Egypt was able to block funding for upstream
development projects in the African Development Bank; additionally, the United States
used its clout in the IMF and World Bank to deny funding to upstream development
projects that would challenge Egypt’s access to the Nile. This control prevented the
economically weak and conflict-ridden upstream countries from undertaking projects
without Egypt’s specific consent or by clearly demonstrating that the project would cause
Egypt no harm.33

28
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Egypt has shown that the defense of the 1959 treaty is its principal objective.
Waterbury writes that Egypt has “maintained great institutional continuity in its water
sector [and],... has patiently cultivated the international arena and donor community for
acquiescence to, if not support for, its priorities”34 This is in clear contrast to upstream
nations that, as Waterbury observes, “have not had consistent objectives, have constantly
remade their institutions in an overall context of political turmoil and periodic purges,
and they have little institutional or expert memory.”35 Despite a rightful claim to a share
of the Nile’s waters, upstream states have been unable to organize and collectively
bargain for an new, more equitable arrangement. Furthermore, Egypt’s willingness to use
their highly sophisticated and internationally financed military to respond to any
upstream threat also deterred development projects. The government has been extremely
blunt about its willingness to defend its water rights. Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat,
famously declared that “the only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.”36
This combination of factors prevented upstream riparians from embarking on
development projects that could harm Egypt’s share of the Nile for the majority of the
20th century.

IV.

Regional Challenges to the Status Quo
This section will examine recent challenges to the status quo brought about by the

increasing relative strength of upstream riparian nations and the simultaneous decrease in

34
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35
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the geo-political strength of Egypt. This will include a discussion of the recent attempts
to come to an agreement over equitable water-sharing policy in light of the population
growth, increasing food shortages in the region and international attempts to develop the
region for food growth. Ethiopia’s vulnerabilities and development potential will also be
discussed. Finally, the regional power dynamic after the Arab Spring will be analyzed
with specific attention paid to the implications of the Grand Renaissance Dam and
potential Egyptian responses.

A. Nile Basin Initiative
The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was created in 1999, and marked the first time
that all ten riparian states have come together to discuss the future of water-sharing on the
Nile. The proclaimed mission of the NBI is to “achieve sustainable socio-economic
development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile
Basin water resources.”37 The organization had hoped to achieve this goal through the
negotiation of a new, comprehensive and inclusive water-sharing agreement.
For thirteen years, the countries of the NBI have been locked in a stalemate and
have been unable to agree on a new arrangement. As the historic regional hegemon and
nation that is most dependent on the Nile, Egypt has no intention of ceding additional
water resources to upstream states. However, the other riparian states argue that the 1959
agreement is a ‘colonial relic’ and non-binding due to the fact that every other upstream
state, with the exception of Ethiopia, was under colonial rule when the treaty was

37
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signed.38 This belief led Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to sign a watersharing treaty called the Entebbe Agreement without unanimous riparian support. This
agreement aligns with other trans-boundary river treaties in that it prevents nations from
using water in a way that would be harmful to downstream countries; conversely,
however, these upstream nations pledged to disregard Egypt’s veto-power over upstream
development projects.39 The Egyptian government reacted to this new treaty, as Pearce
writes, “by going on a high-level diplomatic offensive with offers of aid, backed up by
threats of legal action if its current water ‘rights’ are not upheld.”40 Interestingly, Burundi
had initially refrained from signing the agreement at the urging of Mubarak, but reneged
on its promise only weeks after the fall of his regime confident that there would be no
retaliation from the fledgling transitional government. The Democratic Republic of the
Congo has remained neutral and Eritrea only has observed status in the NBI due to its
position in the river’s watershed. Unsurprisingly, this treaty is opposed by Egypt, Sudan
and South Sudan.

B. Growing Regional Demand
There are a number of modern issues that will further complicate the future of
water sharing. Over the next 40 years, the population of the Nile Basin countries is

38
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39
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<http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2012/09/nile-basin-turning-point-egyptian-revolution-roils-balancepower-competing-demands-proliferate/>.
40
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expected to increase from 429 million people in 2012 to 945 million people.41 According
to experts at Egypt’s Planning Institute, the country will need 50 percent more of the
Nile’s water by 2050 to provide for its growing population.42 Previously, the
development potential of the upstream countries has been limited by insufficient energy
and funds; some countries in the region are currently experiencing rapid economic
growth which will allow them to independently pursue development projects which had
not previously been plausible. For example, Ethiopia’s economy is growing at 7.5 percent
per year, Tanzania’s growth is 6.4 percent and Rwanda’s growth is 8.6 percent.43 Lamere
writes, “growing populations require more water, but so does growing affluence.”44
Egypt’s regional economic dominance is still evident given its relative economic strength
versus the other downstream countries. Egypt’s GDP is $231.9 billion while Ethiopia’s
GDP is $31.2 billion, South Sudan’s GDP is $17.19 billion and Sudan’s is $62.9 billion.45
However, based on current trends, this gap will significantly shrink in coming decades.

C. Ethiopian Vulnerabilities and Development Potential
Despite their willingness to challenge the status quo, Ethiopia is one of the least
developed countries in the world. Ethiopia has a per capita GDP of $1100 compared to

41
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Egypt’s $6600.46 Additionally, only 17 percent of the country’s population has access to
potable water; this percentage will only decrease as the population of the country is
growing at the fifth fastest rate in the world.47 The country is divided into highlands
(above 1500 ft) and lowlands. The highlands are most suitable for rain-fed agriculture but
are wracked by over population and highly degraded due to deforestation, overgrazing,
soil erosion.48 The lowlands are semi-arid and present significant potential for large-scale
irrigation initiatives. Ethiopia has an estimated 2.3 million hectares of which less than 1
percent had been developed.49 Despite this potential, Ethiopia only uses 1 percent of Nile
Water and shortages of rainfall have caused widespread drought and famine.50 Given its
frequent and drastic shortfalls of food production, the country is serious about achieving
self-sufficiency in food production ‘at any cost.’51
Ethiopia has attempted to construct hundreds of small microdams, which are
small-scale irrigation projects that can provide water for a few hundred hectares. While
this infrastructure does not require international financing and is militarily invulnerable,
these dams have numerous problems including the buildup of silt and the ensuing
reduction in water storage capacity, and increased instances of malaria in local
communities.52 Additionally, construction attempts have been halted or abandoned due to
geological challenges resulting in high percentages of lost investment capital. These local

46
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attempts to increase irrigation in the lowlands have failed in most places and further
demonstrate the need for large-scale development.
A 1997 World Bank study reported that “the waters of the Nile probably
constitute Ethiopia’s greatest natural asset for development… the development of the
River Nile has the potential to contribute significantly to poverty reduction, meet
domestic power and food demands, and become a cornerstone of a future Ethiopian
export strategy.”53 Despite widespread poverty, Ethiopia’s economy grew rapidly last
year (2011); however, the Ethiopian economy is largely undiversified as 41 percent of
their GDP comes from agriculture. Sustained economic growth will require expansion
into other industries.54

While Egypt has natural gas and Sudan has oil, upstream

countries have fewer energy options.55 Ethiopia’s installed capacity of hydropower dams
is 3 percent of its potential and the economic rates of return on these projects are among
the highest in the world.5657 According to Waterbury et al., “if Ethiopia continues to
liberalize its economy and is politically stable, it may be anticipated that funds will be
available from a variety of sources to finance… other larger water resources development
projects in the Blue Nile watershed.”58 Development projects on the Nile could give
Ethiopia the option to export excess hydroelectric power to upstream countries due to its
own low per capita energy consumption. This could substantially add to the country’s
low GDP, diversify economic activity and provide cheap power to rural households. Nile
development projects could also facilitate the irrigation of additional land, which could
53
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help the country increase its food security. As of now, rain-fed agriculture has been
unable to meet the food requirements of the population.59 The failure to utilize this
resource in light of population projections, and economic and environmental degradation
will only serve to plunge Ethiopia’s population into greater poverty.

D. International Development Pressures and Agricultural Potential in East Africa

There will be further stress on water resources in the region as 16.9 million
hectares in East Africa, principally Ethiopia and Uganda were sold or leased to foreign
investors after the 2008 food crisis. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, India and the United
Arab Emirates are countries that need to import food to meet the demands of their
population due to insufficient agricultural conditions. Agribusiness companies in India
plan to spend $2.5 billion to buy or rent land in Ethiopia and Uganda. They are able to the
rent the land for around $1.50/year per hectare for contracts up to 100 years making it
some of the cheapest land in the world.60 Much of this land will be used to grow palm oil,
cereal and sugarcane – one of the most water intensive crops.61 The poor governments of
these East African countries have welcomed companies heralding this foreign direct
investment for its potential to create employment in the region. In reality, the government
has been handing out subsidies and tax exemptions to these companies at the expense of
local communities; thousands of local residents are facing eviction, pastoralist farmers
are being excluded from land they have historically used for grazing and much of this
land will be used to grow food for export further depriving rural areas that are already
59
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food insecure.62 The Nile Basin will face increased agricultural and irrigation pressure to
grow this food with negligible development consequences for any countries involved.63

E. The Arab Spring and the Grand Renaissance Dam
Despite Egypt’s historical maintenance of the status quo, recent events have
shaken the regional power dynamic. In 2011, Hosni Mubarak stepped down as the
Egyptian leader after 30 years following protests. Additionally, the Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi died in August 2012 after 17 years in office, and the newly
independent South Sudan hopes to clarify and guarantee its rights pertaining to the 1959
Agreement. This series of events have raised questions about Egyptian President
Mohamed Morsi’s ability to maintain the country’s hydro-political hegemony in the Nile
Basin.
Evidence of Egypt’s dwindling power in the region has been detected. Just weeks
after Mubarak stepped down, the Ethiopians unveiled an aggressive development project
known as the Grand Renaissance Dam (GRD). This is a part of a long-term national
effort to spend close to $12 billion by 2035 on development projects on Ethiopia’s
various rivers to generate an estimated 40,000 megawatts of power.64 The GRD is
projected to produce 5,250 megawatts of energy, can hold 65 bcm of water and will cost
an estimated $5 billion. Some economists predict that only 10 percent of the funding has
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been raised.65 International investors include China and Djibouti, but many international
investors are wary of supporting the project for fear it would spark further conflict in the
region. The rest of the funding will be raised through the sale of government bonds and
taxes raises. This price tag is equivalent to almost the entire budget of the country. This
has prompted concerns by the IMF that the construction of the GRD will absorb all
domestic financing.66 However, as one Ethiopian remarked, “We’re going to do this with
or without you. The Ethiopian government is issuing bonds and the population, all 85
million of us, are buying bonds in order to chip in to this huge Nile project.67 Ethiopian
officials have announced that the dam is on track to be completed by 2015 and around 13
percent of total construction is completed.
The hydro-electric potential of this dam is enormous and Ethiopia will use the
power to fuel its own growth and sells the surplus to upstream neighbors. One Ethiopian
diplomat referred to the dam as “an ATM of hard currency for Ethiopia.”68 Additionally,
the Dam will create a reservoir almost twice as large as Ethiopia’s largest natural lake,
Lake Tana, creating enormous irrigation potential.69 The specifics of the dam’s potential
are still unclear as there have been no published studies on its economic or environmental
impact. The government has heralded the project for its ability to propel Ethiopia into the
future and enable them to move beyond their current aid-based economy.70
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The GRD will cause a significant reduction of the flow of water to downstream
countries during the period of time when the dam is being filled. It is predicted that it
could take 2-3 years for this process to occur; estimates depend on annual rainfall.71
Egypt would experience around a 25 percent reduction in its water flows during this time
and have no guarantee that they will be able to maintain their present share of water. 72

F. The Egyptian Response
Egyptian government officials are certain that the completion of the GRD project
will have dire consequences for the country. Egypt views this project as a direct threat to
its national security and has transferred responsibility for organizing a response to its
Interior Ministry. When Ethiopia built a smaller, 580-megawatt hydroelectric dam in
2010, which had a fraction of the storage capabilities of the proposed GRD, Egypt
ordered its military to “prepare for any eventuality.”73
The Egyptian government could respond to this threat in a variety of ways.74 First,
it could put diplomatic pressure on the Ethiopian government, as any change to Egypt’s
water flow is technically illegal under the 1959 agreement. The Egyptian government has
funded a tripartite committee with scientists from Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia to study the
downstream effects of the dam. If it is proven that their supply will be threatened,
diplomatic pressure may deter other international lenders from providing the remainder
of the funding for the GRD for fear of souring relations with the Egyptians. Secondly, the
71
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Egyptian government could support proxy military groups to create political instability in
the Ethiopia. This would likely involve engaging Eritrean rebels who have historically
become involved in intensifying ethnic grievances within Ethiopia; this would serve to
unsettle the ethnically divided government.75 Lastly, if the issue becomes ‘securitized,’
the government could utilize military force to halt the construction of the dam. This
would depend on the characteristics of Morsi’s new government, but any large-scale
reduction would likely be intolerable.76 The likelihood of this response is demonstrated
by a leaked WikiLeaks document that claims Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir agreed
to host an Egyptian airbase with the explicit purpose of developing the capability to
launch a military attack on the dam.77
No matter Egypt’s response, the construction of the GRD will have profound
regional implications and directly threaten Egypt’s 5000-year control of the Nile. The
Arab Spring has created immense monetary volatility and political turmoil in Egypt. The
Egyptian economy has stalled, the new government has offended former allies and
protests continue to plague the country. This environment has diminished the
government’s traditional ability to stonewall financing and diplomatic support for the
upstream development projects.78 Since the revolution, many decisions have been made
to upset control and patronage within organizations that have traditionally helped Egypt
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maintain control.79 Specifically, the military government has upset its long-standing
relationship with the United States. For example, the government put American
democracy activists and their Egyptian colleagues on trial for attempting to undermine
the state.80 The revolutionaries ridiculed at the $3.2 billion aid package from the IMF and
then backtracked and asked for additional funding.81 Because the United States is the
biggest stakeholder in both the IMF and the World Bank, this will undoubtedly reduce
US willingness to block needed development projects for upstream countries to maintain
Egypt’s status quo with respect to the Nile’s waters.

V.

Literature Review
In order to understand the regional conflict over the Nile, it is essential to consider

water-sharing norms, and investigate the international law and theory that dictate riparian
behavior. Muhammad Rahaman discusses various theories of sovereignty, their relevance
to international law and ability to manage cross-boundary resource sharing. The theory of
absolute territorial sovereignty says that nations can utilize waters flowing through their
territory to their full advantage and have no duty to consult with other riparian states.
This effectively means that upstream states could utilize all resources without regard to
downstream need.82 This theory is generally rejected and is not invoked in the creation of
international water sharing law. The alternative theory of absolute territorial integrity
states that downstream nations have the right to “the continued and uninterrupted flow of
79
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water from the territory of the upper riparian… ‘no matter what the priority.’”83
Interference to this flow by upstream actors requires the consent of downstream
countries. For obvious reasons, this theory is often supported by downstream countries;
however, it also has limited support within the international legal community because it
places downstream interests ahead of an equitable agreement in the best interest of all
riparians.
Finally, the theory of limited territorial sovereignty states that every nation can
utilize waters flowing through their territory as long as “utilization does not prejudice the
rights and interests of co-riparians.”84 This theory is most often used to draft international
law as it recognizes the equal rights of both upstream and downstream riparians, and
includes a ‘obligation not to cause significant harm.’85 This theory was invoked in the
drafting of the Entabbe Treaty signed by upstream riparans as they hoped to develop a
water-sharing agreement that would equally benefit all involved parties; this would
replace the existing treaty that allows Egypt to ‘cause significant harm’ to other riparian
states.
Jorg Barandat and Aytul Kaplan argue that access to fresh water is a foremost
national security issue and that international water law is an inadequate instrument to
influence the behavior of riparian states because it lacks effective enforcement
mechanisms to ensure the equitable use of this shared resource.86 The most notable
international water-sharing standards are outlined in the Helsinki Rules and drafted by the
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International Law Association in 1966. This framework advocates trans-boundary
cooperation and equitable sharing to promote social equality, economic growth and
environmental and ecological protection.87 Specifically, these rules require one riparian to
inform all other riparian nations of any pending development projects that may harm their
interests.88 Additionally, the Helsinki Rules advocates the collection and sharing of data
among all riparians so they may fully understand the externalities of development
projects; it also calls for reasonable compensation if the interests of the state are
violated.89 The authors point out that this treaty fails “to sufficiently define the utilization
or consumption of water, establish binding criteria for equitable utilization, and clearly
fix priorities with respect different kinds of utilization.”90 While the Helsinki Rules lay
out an important framework for multilateral negotiations, it requires states to give up their
absolute territorial sovereignty over a shared water resource which is often outside of
their national interest.
Rainer Durth discusses the conditions under which cooperative solutions between
riparian countries emerge. He writes, “cooperation will only come about if the riparian
states are prepared to submit themselves to credible sanctions in the event of
infringements of treaty obligations.”91 This statement further exploits the inadequacies of
the Helsinki Rules as states have no incentive to submit ‘to credible sanctions.’ He argues
that this type of self-regulation will only emerge if there is a mutual dependency between
states. He points to integrated regions such as the European Union (EU) as an example of
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a successful mutual dependence. The EU countries have a duty and interest in
cooperating on issues, such as pollution, that effect their entire region.92 Conversely, this
cooperation will not emerge if upstream and downstream states have “radically different
ideas about the fair usage or division of international resources.”93 Without agreed upon
enforcement mechanisms and self-imposed sanctions, an international legal framework
based on mutual cooperation will be largely ineffective.
John Waterbury further elaborates on the determinants of collective action
between riparian states. Waterbury acknowledges that collective action theory is better at
explaining noncooperation; however he claims that while it is undoubtedly difficult to
initiate and sustain, collective action is not rare.94 He argues that most international
treaties are not demanding, compliance is difficult to monitor and there are no credible
repercussions for defection.95 Therefore, adherence to established treaties “buys observer
status at a minimum, and access to the data and reporting of other members…[and
confers] some legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.”96 However, when
“bottom-line national interests are at stake,” regimes may “throw international legitimacy
to the winds.”97 He argues that this is the case in the Nile Basin as the “quasi-regime,”
consisting of Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan, consider the maintenance of the status quo
to be a matter of national security. Waterbury predicts that any collective agreement will
be “open to periodic renegotiation and adjustment as the cost-benefit analysis of each of
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the parties to the regime changes.”98 This inability to create a cooperative water-sharing
agreement is a direct result of the fact that no mutual dependence can be created; there is
no community of Nile riparians.99 The Nile states have and will act as unitary actors, and
there is weak domestic support for the creation of a functional regime encompassing all
riparian nations. He argues that only rational, interest-based solutions can be applied in
this scenario and would inevitably require Egypt to harm its long-term interests in the
name of collective cooperation.100
Stefan Deconinck points out that in the absence of a proactive approach by Egypt
to adopt new policies and address inefficient water usage, this issue may become
‘securitized;’ this means Egypt will feel compelled to use its military resources to protect
its control of the Nile. He attempts to dissect the rationale behind countries who “wield
an official discourse of water scarcity and emergency, while wasting precious amounts of
water through poor water management.”101 This includes an analysis of the conditions
under which resource scarcity becomes a security threat for one country while remaining
a policy issue for another. He argues that this shift occurs when an actor “refers to an
issue as an existential threat, and tries to convince an audience that extraordinary
measures must be taken to contain the problem.”102 Without basin-wide cooperation or
effective preparation for the time when the supply of water is insufficient to meet the
demand, the Egyptian government could invoke this tactic to protect their historic rights
and attack Ethiopia’s dam.
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VI.

Hypothetical Cooperative Solutions

Though highly unlikely, it is interesting to consider a couple of potential regional projects
that would create a win-win outcome for all actors. First, the region should consider the
inadequacies of the Aswan High Dam. Lake Nasser is an ‘amazingly inefficient bank’
where between 10 and 16 bcm evaporate from its surface; this is more than a quarter of
the river’s flow in some years.103 British engineers opposed the creation of a giant dam at
this site for precisely this reason; instead they wanted to build a series of dams upstream
in the ravines of Ethiopia where the temperature would be cooler and the surface area
smaller.104 Pearce writes that “it would be expensive, and a major concession for Egypt to
allow the main faucet on the river to move to another country—particularly its regional
rival, Ethiopia… [but] it would massively add to the amount of water flowing down the
Nile.”105 Pearce argues that a single, regulating dam in the most hydro -logically efficient
location would be a solution to this regional dispute and would leave enough water ‘for
nature, as well as for the people of the Nile.”106
Additionally, the region could consider reviving the Jonglei Canal project. In
1978, The Egyptian and Sudanese governments resurrected an older British project to dig
the Jonglei Canal through the Sudd swamps in Southern Sudan.107 They dug 260 km of
the planned 360 km of the canal, but were forced to stop due to intensifying civil war in
Sudan. The Sudd is a wetland in the middle of the desert that is created by spillage from
the Nile’s second tributary, the White Nile. This swamp stretches for more than 40,000
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km and causes the evaporation of almost half of the White Nile’s discharge in the
process.108 If this project was completed and the water was diverted through the canal
instead of evaporating in the swamps, an additional 5 bcm will be available to the
downstream countries. While this solution would allow more water to be taken from the
Nile by upstream countries without harming Egypt’s allocation, it would have detrimental
effects on the Sudd’s ecosystem, which supports an enormous and diverse wildlife.
Despite these regional solutions that could be collectively undertaken, this
literature review puts the Nile Basin conflict into a theoretical framework which suggests
that the international water law and norms have historically been ineffective at solving
conflicts that involve such diverse actors, priorities and goals. These authors present a
highly pessimistic outlook for collective cooperation by the riparian states; therefore, in
the interest of regional stability and the avoidance of war, it is necessary to consider a
policy proposals that will modify current water usage in Egypt and solutions that directly
relate to a more sustainable utilization of this resource.

VII.

Egypt’s Water Policies and Agricultural Inefficiencies
It is essential to consider the deteriorating domestic water situation in Egypt,

which has emerged as a direct result of the government’s unrealistic and inefficient
policies. In addition to the increasing regional demand for a more equitable water-sharing
solution, Egypt itself is facing high population growth, rising food prices and dwindling
agricultural productivity. Though Egypt uses the large majority of the Nile’s waters, it
per capita water allotment has been falling and is now 800 cubic meters per person which
108
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places the population in the category of ‘water scare’ as defined by the United Nations.109
This is largely due to the fact that only 15-20 per cent of Egypt’s water allotment goes
towards household consumption. The remaining water is used to irrigate land to grow
food for the country’s growing population. It is essential to consider both the macro-level
policy decisions that the Egyptian government is making to deal with this population
pressure and the related food needs, and the micro-level inefficiencies of the agricultural
sector including those of the government water bureaucracy.

a. Macro-Level Policy Challenges
Despite the increasing controversy over the Nile and the imminent needs of its
population, the Egyptians are undertaking several development projects that require a
significant amount of water. Egypt is considering several reclamation schemes, such as
the New Valley Project, that would redirect a significant portion of its water endowment
to the Western Desert. The New Valley Project is part of the government’s plan to deal
with population growth in Egypt. Around 95 percent of Egypt’s population lives in the
Nile Delta and the river valley.110 Egypt plans to divert between 5 and 10 bcm from the
AHD to the Western Desert to irrigate this land to move people to areas with lowpopulation density and grow additional food. When the project is finished, between
300,000 and 500,000 additional hectares will be irrigated.111
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The question is, given the fact that only 0.5 bcm of the Nile’s water reaches the
Mediterranean and the rest is used within Egyptian borders, where will the additional
water for the New Valley Project come from? The government claims that they will not
overdraw from its Nile allotment but instead will find the water by “use existing water
supplies more efficiently, fostering water conservation efforts, abstracting ground water,
using reclaimed wastewater and shifting out of the sugar cane and rice to less waterintensive crops.”112 Yohannes points out that “the diversion of 5.5 bcm of Nile water to
the western desert casts a shadow on the elites’ commitment to efficiency.”113 While
these conservation efforts need to be considered in the grand scheme of things, these
water-savings will be needed to make up for shortages when Ethiopia completes
construction of the GRD and cannot be used to irrigate hyper-arid desert land. Egypt’s
allotment of water as outlined by the 1959 Agreement is contingent upon minimal water
use by upstream countries. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to irrigate this
additional land and provide for its growing population even with savings from improved
efficiency. This New Valley project, and the use of valuable water to grow food in an
area that is hyper-arid, is not an economically rational decision for Egypt.
The New Valley Project is only one of the development factors stressing Egypt’s
water resources. Suburban development in and around Cairo is also utilizing enormous
amounts of water to accommodate the lifestyles of the city’s elite at the expense of the
poor. In 2004, despite the government’s inability to create an effective pricing system to
control the agricultural and irrigation sectors, it sought to experiment with a water-pricing
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scheme in Cairo. It began to privatize its urban water facilities in order to increase
efficiency; this reform forced water utility companies to operate at a profit, which
resulted in the water price doubling in some areas of the city. The majority of this water
has been diverted from small fishing and farming villages that cannot afford to pay the
city’s high prices. This has forced many residents of Cairo, where around 40 percent live
on less than $2 a day, to get water from the dirty Nile canals.114 An analysis of the city’s
water supply by a local NGO found that 75 percent of the samples distributed in the low
income area of Manshiyat Naser, or Garbage City, did not meet the minimum standards
for drinking water as outlined by the city.115 Tens of thousands of Egyptians protested
water shortages this summer (2012) and claim that they are suffering from environmental
bias; this is shown “towards cities over villages, coastal areas over southern ones, and
rich ones over the poor.”116

b. Characteristics of Egypt’s Agricultural and Irrigation Sectors
Egypt’s agriculture and irrigation sectors are currently wracked with
inefficiencies and are entirely unequipped to handle a future reduction in water. Already,
both Egypt’s ground water and surface water resources are fully exploited.117 Egypt’s
agriculture sector utilizes 80-85 percent of the water from the AHD; however, the
industry only accounts for 20 percent of the country’s GDP and 30 percent of the
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workforce.118 The efficiency of water use within the agriculture sector is measured at
between 60 and 70 percent.119 This percentage drops significantly if only irrigation
methods are analyzed. By some estimates, only 2 percent of Egypt’s 3.2 million hectares
used for agriculture are irrigated by efficient methods.120 As Okbazghi Yohannes
explains, “if efforts to improve demand side management, conservation, and the efficient
use of water are not supported, the consequences could be dire.”121
The majority of Egypt’s agricultural sector has high crop yield per unit of land
and high cropping intensity in comparison to country averages; this is due to its favorable
climate for many species including tomatoes, potatoes, grapes and strawberries.122
Merrey points out that, “maintaining the high cropping intensity and increasing the value
of agricultural output will be impossible if water supplies are stretched too thinly, and
become unreliable.”123 Currently, only 3.5 percent of Egypt’s land mass, mainly in the
Nile’s Delta, is being utilized as agricultural land.124 The government has invested
heavily in expanding the amount of irrigated land since the completion of the AHD to
reduce population density in the Basin and grow additional food. This is exemplified by
the New Valley project and other land reclamation projects. The current rate of
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reclamation is around 37,000 hectares a year and requires a substantial amount of Egypt’s
current water allotment.125
The irrigation system is a complex system of channels that lead from the AHD to
the most rural villages. (Figure 2)126 Water is released from the AHD into a single
irrigation tunnel that features seven barrages, or large gates, that control water flow into
the canal branches; this water flow is continuous. The most significant barrage is directly
after Cairo and release water into to the Rosetta and Damietta branches which carry water
to various areas of the Delta. From these branches, water is siphoned into distributaries,
or mesquas, according to a rotation schedule -- not a continuous flow. The water from the
mesquas is manually pumped from the canals to irrigate nearby fields.127

c. The MPWWR and its Excessive Bureaucracy
In order to maintain the productivity of the sector given the substantial
competition for the Nile’s resources, there must be efforts to increase efficiency and
maintain productivity. The current government agency that manages Egypt’s water
resources, the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resource (MPWWR), treats Egypt’s
water as if it is unlimited. Its current policies are only contributing to water scarcity and
there is a need for institutional reform.128 Merrey refers to greater efficiency within the
organization prior to the construction of the AHD as the organization had to manage both
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flood and drought crises.129 After the completion of the dam, the MPWWR had a water
surplus in most years which deteriorated its incentive to maintain an efficient irrigation
system. Its efficiency dropped further in the late-1980s when the government shifted
from a policy of controlling crop patterns to a policy that allows the ‘market’ to drive
demand for certain crops – without charging for water. 130 Due to these loose regulations,
many Egyptian farmers’ now grow cash crops such as sugarcane and rice whose growth
is highly water-intensive. The MPWWR has failed to adapt its policies to reflect the
country’s growing population, soaring food prices and the fact that its share of the Nile is
under threat. The Ministry needs to alter its institutional objectives and governing
policies to reflect the fact that the country is now moving towards a period of water
scarcity. Primarily, this will involve reforms to improve cost recovery, accountability,
water quality and distribution, etc. in order to create an institution capable of dealing with
the impending crisis.
The MPWWR has a full-time staff of more than 88,000 employees, with the
Irrigation Department being the largest; its responsibilities are diverse and extensive. The
Ministry is in charge of policy-making, construction and design for civil works projects,
maintenance and operation of water distribution and drainage from the AHD, coastal
protection, etc.131 The MPWWR is highly centralized. Merrey points out that “authority
is held mostly at higher levels and there is little participation of lower-levels in decisionmaking; and there is little accountability of higher to lower levels, or the organization to
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its customers.”132 There is a general reluctance to delegate authority from the top-tier of
the organization due to engrained systems of patronage and a lack of operational
protocol.133
This top-down system has resulted in private interests, specifically those of large
landowners, being represented and prioritized within the organization.134 It has been
reported that under the Mubarak regime, small-scale farmers were forcibly evicted from
their land so that political elites could settle and develop there.135Those that are wealthy
and have political connections had few complaints about dependability in the system.
This is reflected by the results of survey in which small-scale farmers in middle Egypt
and the Delta ranked ‘absolute water shortage’ as their most pressing problem while
larger farmers had few complaints about consistency in their water supply.136 Local
farmers, as Radwan argues, “have been divested of any meaningful control over the
patterns of [water] supply with the result that cooperation…has been replaced by a large
degree of individualism, as farmers limit their attention to their own specific needs in a
local context.”137 There is high variability in the water supply to the small-scale,
fragmented farms in Egypt’s rural areas which have caused prevalent reports of overpumping and the premature depletion of the canals when there is water. This inequality in
distribution has forced rural farmers to account for future shortages thereby taking more
than their share of the resource and harming their downstream neighbors; there have also
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been reports of farmers using untreated sewage to rescue their crops which poses
enormous health risks to the community and livestock.138

d. Failure of Informational Linkages
As Merrey points out, “there is no information on how much water is delivered to
specific areas and no capacity to measure and allocate specified amount of water. There
is no clear sense of water rights… no basis for establishing and enforcing such rights, and
no clear priorities for water use.”139 The MPWWR accepts that there is a high margin of
error in their calculation of national water requirements and in the past, it has embraced a
policy that releases water in the canals in far excess of their estimates.140 However, as
illustrated, this surplus discharge from the AHD still creates shortages in certain areas.
The water released from the AHD into the canal system is largely unregulated and the
government has no knowledge of how this water is distributed into the lower-level or
distributaries canals. Additionally, surplus water flowing into sparsely populated canal
routes flows into escape structures and enters the drainage system.141 The waste from the
canals is supposed to be regulated by MPWWR water guards, or bahhar, who are
required to visit all sections of the canals on a daily basis. In reality. the guards rarely
visit the canal ends and fail to consistently measure water levels.142 Due to this
ineffective management, much water remains unused and some valuable water is
siphoned into the Mediterranean. The bahhar is supposed to act as the liaison between
138
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the farmers and the MPWWR; however, the delegation of power to the local level has
failed due to weak linkages between the various levels of the organization. This systemic
breakdown has created informational shortages, which has resulted in significant water
waste.

e. Supply and Demand Allocation Inefficiencies
The inequality and unreliability in the irrigation system is exacerbated by the
inefficient mechanisms for determining water demand; the calculated need has become
increasingly unrealistic as the government relies on the likely cropping pattern at the
beginning of each season, previous growth volume and other outdated data.143 Attempts
to average a nationwide community ‘quota’ without specific information has been be
extremely inaccurate due to varying conditions across rural areas such as the quality of
the irrigation infrastructure, crop type, climate, etc.

For example, in the village of

Yaquat, the cropping patterns submitted to the government did not accurately reflect the
true needs of the community. The land area was overestimated by 5 percent due to a
failure to update land records either due to negligence or corruption.144 Once these
inaccuracies are calculated at the national level, there is an enormous amount of
inefficiency and waste in the water allocation system which leads to an abundance of
water in some areas and deficiencies in other areas.
There have been diverse community-based responses to deal with the variability
in supply. The situation varies across the country depending on whether the community is
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receiving a surplus of water or facing shortages. Those facing shortages can appeal to the
bahhar to request additional water; however, in many cases these requests are refused
based on the assumption that they are unjustified.145 In reality, these local agents of the
MPWWR have little authority to increase discharge and do not want to become involved
in a direct confrontation with their superiors.146 In the rare case that these demands reach
higher levels of the organization, usually due to the influence of a bribe, any resulting
increase is usually short-term.147 The failure of the government to solve these problem
forces individuals to utilize informal methods to ensure their water supply; these
techniques often have harmful effects of their neighbors and community at large. In rural
areas, water is released on a rotational schedule meaning that it comes once every 10-15
days if it arrives on schedule.148 One resident of rural Abu Sir explains, “each small canal
has to pass through a series of villages, and because of the water scare, everyone is taking
more. So, by the time it gets to the end of the canal, it’s drained.”149 Therefore, farmers
will often water ahead of requirements when there is a surplus of water in their canal.
Additionally, some water users take precautionary measures and engage in the practice of
‘damming,’ meaning that upstream farmers block-off the mesqua immediately before the
inlet to their fields to get a buildup of water. Damming blocks access to the canals for

145

Ibid, 53.
Ibid.
147
Ibid.
148
Amin, "Egypt's Farmers Desperate for Clean Water."
149
Viney, Steven. "Rural Irrigation Canals Are Afflicted by Water Shortages and Contaminated Water."
Egypt Independent. N.p., 13 Aug. 2012. Web. 01 Dec. 2012.
<http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/rural-irrigation-canals-are-afflicted-water-shortages-andcontaminated-water>.
146

37

users father downstream and often creates community-wide conflict regarding fair
allocation of their limited resources.150

f. Water as a Public Good
The federal government provides water without any charge to local farmers. In
most rural areas, irrigation water is free but farmers have to pay monthly fees for the
maintenance and running of the pumps that bring water out of the mesquas.151 The only
limiting incentive on the amount of usable water is the effort of pumping water from the
canal to the fields and, of course, the availability of the water. Given these factors and the
political unpopularity for a water-pricing system in Egypt, the current cost recovery
system is extremely ineffective. Additionally, there is high concern regarding water
quality in the country. While there are laws that govern pollution levels, the enforcement
of these standards have been sub-par. Dumping garbage in the irrigation canals has
become common in rural areas due to a lack of waste management facilities; when water
flow is low, the garbage accumulates and poses significant health risks to the crops and
the community.152

g. Implications
This lack of accountability to the public, inefficiency and excessive bureaucracy
is characteristic of many of the Egypt’s governing organizations. Merrey predicts that
changing “old, large organizations, with their long traditions, large numbers, and political
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power of their vested interests, and their critical… [importance] to the economy will not
be an easy job and will not be accomplished in a short period.”153 Efficiency can only be
achieved if there is accurate, community specific data regarding seasonal cropping
patterns in each area, delivery efficiency, water quality, etc. This information can only be
collected with the cooperation of the local farmers who feel that they will gain, not lose
precious water, by complying.154 This lack of regulation, community-specific knowledge,
and the inefficient management of the lower canal system has resulted in excessive water
allocated to certain areas of the country while others are extremely water deprived. If
management at the national level cannot be reformed, there must be a re-delegation of
power, likely to a community-based water distribution system

VIII. Mexican Irrigation Reform
Given the systemic inefficiencies in the Egyptian institution that govern the
nation’s scare water resources and the concern over the likelihood of improvement, it is
necessary to look at the strategies undertaken by the Mexican government to delegate
power away from the federal level and reforms its water resource allocation system. This
endeavor by Mexico began in the mid-eighties and was driven more by budgetary
pressures exacerbated by economic crisis within the country than a shortage of water or
food supplies. Mexico implemented successful irrigation reform based on the use of
Water User Associations (WUAs). While the driving factor behind irrigation reform
differs between Egypt and Mexico, many of the characteristics of the Mexican water
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sector prior to reform align with the current situation in Egypt. Primarily, the Mexican
institution governing the water sector, The Mexican Ministry of Agriculture and Water
Resources (MAWR), was awash with bureaucratic excess, similar to the Egyptian
MPWWR. As part of the reform effort, the government reduced the amount of
government officials in the sector 40,000 to 4,000.155 Additionally, the Mexican water
sector was characterized by an excessive amount of government subsidies in order to
meet demand without effectively charging farmers for water use. Mexico’s water
operation and management costs were extremely high, and its cost recovery system was
negligible leading to an immense financial burden on the government. This burden is
similarly felt by the Egyptian government due to their policy of ‘meeting’ water demand
without charging users. One Mexican government official remarked “at the beginning
[the MAWR] thought the machines the most important, the office, the infrastructure, the
canals and the dams, but now they think water is the most valuable resource they
control”156 Additionally, the Mexican government faced immense degradation in its canal
infrastructure and drainage systems which is also prevalent in much of Egyptian rural
areas.
While there are marked difference between the two countries and their respective
crises, aspects of the Mexican strategy can be utilized in Egypt to begin to address this
‘creeping crisis.’157 Historically, the Mexican irrigation system was characterized by high
levels of government subsidies for all farmers belonging to cooperatives in irrigation

155

Rap, Edwin. "The Success of a Policy Model: Irrigation Management Transfer in Mexico." The Journal
of Development Studies 42.8 (2007): 1301-324. 24 Jan. 2007. Web. 1 Dec. 2012.
www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjds20, 1318.
156
Ibid.
157
Merrey,"Governances and Institutional Arrangements for Managing Water Resources in Egypt," 3.

40

districts. Cummings and Nercissiantz point out that this meant “with few exceptions…
farmers have never been required to repay capital costs association with water…
moreover, for long periods of time, [operation and management] costs were heavily
subsidized by the government.”158 These inefficiencies created immense budgetary
pressure on the MAWR. Rap explains that “public management of irrigation districts led
to poor irrigation performance and decreasing levels of productivity, because the
government bureaucracy lacked the incentives and responsiveness to optimize
management performance.”159 The administration sought to transfer management to the
local level. The government wanted users to participate in this restructuring so that
effective incentives would exist to improve efficiency and lower costs.160
Beginning in 1989, the country embraced a series of neoliberal policies to
radically reform its water management system by transferring control of their irrigation
sector to WUAs. The Mexican government created the Comision Nacional del Aqua
(CONAGUA), an organization whose sole purpose was to oversee the transfer of water
authority from the MAWR to WUAs. Under the reform, MAWR was merged with
CONAGUA; at the highest level, CONAGUA would be responsible for “establishing
policies, norms, [and] standards, approving and supervising plans and annual budgets…
[and] supervision, monitoring and evaluation of all activities at the national and basin
levels.”161 CONAGUA divided the country’s agricultural lands into modules that had
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clearly defined boundaries and could operate as autonomous organizations.162 Each
module was to become financially independent and develop a staff not administratively
reliant on CONAGUA’s jurisdiction. The leadership of the WUAs would be chosen
directly by the users and the WUA as an organization would be financially dependent on
the users. This created an incentive structure to reduce the costs of water management
from both the user and administrative perspectives. The users would choose
administrators that could most effectively reduce costs.163 This system significantly
strengthened property rights to water and provided users with clear roles and
responsibilities. The WUAs now operate the majority of Mexico’s canals and
CONAGUA maintains only the head structures of the system including dams and
multiuse canals.164 The WUAs have improved operation and maintenance costs, and
achieved financial autonomy and administrative self-sufficiency.165 Today, 452 WUAs
comprising of 506,000 water users manage total land of 3.3 million hectares.166
Interestingly, both the population of Mexico and agricultural land under development at
the time of reform are not dissimilar from those of Egypt.
The rapid implementation of these reforms by the Mexican government and the
ensuing success of its policies have been heralded by the international community as an
example for other countries to emulate to cut costs and improve the performance of their
irrigation sector.167 Rap points out that the replication of this type of model requires
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strong government commitment at the highest level supplemented by ‘champions’ of
reform who can mobilize support within the legislative bodies.168 Additionally, the
effectiveness of WUAs is grounded in an effective legal framework with defined
ownership of water resources and strong property rights protection.169 The cornerstone of
success is the financial self-sufficiency of the WUAs; in Mexico, the water users pay a
fee to the WUA prior to receiving the water to ensure the longevity of the organization.170
This has resulted in more than 90 percent of users paying their assessed charges.171

IX.

Egypt’s Irrigation Improvement Program
In 1996, the Egyptian government experimented with the implementation of

WUAs through a series of pilot programs in select rural areas to test the feasibility of a
shift towards community management of water resources. This project was called the
Irrigation Improvement Program (IIP) and was a joint venture between USAID and
MPWWR It is essential to compare this program to the strategies undertaken by the
Mexican government. While the IIP programs were only implemented in a few villages,
the outcome of these policies highlight essential areas that need to be modified before a
nationwide shift to WUA control can be successful.
A primary goal of the IIP effort was to “increase MPWWR knowledge and
capabilities to analyze and formulate strategies, policies and plans related to integrated
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water supply augmentation, conservation and utilization.”172 Unlike in the Mexican case
where the majority of power was delegated to the local level, the IPP effort did not seek
to abolish the MPWWR, but sought to strengthen its institutional capacity; as discussed
above, efforts to change such a large, historic organization are extremely difficult.173
In Egypt, the main duties of the WUAs would include “scheduling of water
delivery on mesquas, perform maintenance and resolve disputes, [and] increase
communication links between farmers and government officials.”174 A new branch of the
MPWWR called the Irrigation Advisory Service (IAS) would oversee the WUAs. While
literature on the IIP effort alludes to a grand devolution of power to the WUAs, the local
responsibilities have essentially stayed the same. The problem still lies in the
unresponsiveness of the MPWWR to the local demands of the farmers. The effectiveness
of the Mexican WUA system lays in their distributional and financial autonomy. One of
the keys to the Mexican success is the effectiveness of CONAGUA at ensuring that the
national and local governments work together. The Mexicans effectively eliminated the
power of the MAWR and consolidated its institutional responsibilities in CONAGUA,
giving it a largely advisory role. A joint report between the MPWWR and USAID
evaluating the administrative capability of the IIP expresses doubts about the ability of
the government to provide sufficient staff to educate farmers about efficient water
management practices; initial IIP reports showed inadequate staffing levels and high
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turnover rates.175 The paper states that this effort “must be supported and championed at a
high level within the responsible governing agency.”176 However, the MPWWR has not
fundamentally changed as an organization to make it better suited to manage these
essential aspects of the irrigation sector; it still retains the power structures that have
proven to be costly and ineffective at gathering information, delegating water
appropriately, and monitoring the quality, flow and waste of the water. A similar
devolution of power from the MPWWR to the IAS, similar to the Mexican case, should
be considered.
Furthermore, the IIP effort sought to implement policies that would recover ‘a
portion’ of governmental costs of operation and maintenance of the irrigation system, and
also cover 100 percent of costs for mesqua upkeep.177The USAID and MPWWR report
points to several market failure considerations that could thwart the success of this cost
recovery effort. These include lack of farmer knowledge and awareness of the IIP
program, high transaction costs, lack of credit and property rights issues.178 It is estimated
that the implementation of the IIP effort costs approximately $1092/hectare of land with
the majority of the costs emanating from necessary mesqua improvements. Without a
clear delegation of property rights to the local level and an assurance that reliability will
be improved, these poor, rural farmers have no incentive to pay for these improvements.
Because leadership at the local level is still responsible to the MPWWR through the IAS
teams, there is no incentive to become financially autonomous when the government can
still be relied upon to absorb some local costs.
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The IIP effort also included components of physical change. The IIP advocated a
continuous flow in the branch and distributaries canals; previously only principal and
main canals ran continuously and other branches ran on a rotational basis.179 This was an
attempt to address complaints of inadequate, unreliable, and uneven distribution of water
through the canal system. Where this IIP- advocated continuous flow was implemented,
all communities faced water shortages at the expense of the few under the pilot program.
This was due to the fact that the MPWWR staff did not initially understand the hydraulic
capabilities needed to maintain continuous flow, which were not adequate in many of the
canal branches.180 However, those participating in the IIP pilot programs experienced a
marked increase in reliability. Hvidt reports that within the IIP program, “the presence of
a well-functioning continuous flow regime in the branch canals was the single most
important factors contributing to security of water control at farm level.”181 If these
infrastructure improvements can be made on a nationwide level, continuous flow
irrigation would significantly improve reliability in the water delivery services. However,
this is a very expensive undertaking. As the USAID and MPWWR reports concludes,
“even though farm level benefits of the IIP may appear attractive, farmers have little
chance of realizing these benefits without concurrent MPWWR action to improve the
main system and provide better irrigation delivery service.”182 While improvements have
been reported in the areas of water reliability and equitable distribution of the resource in
the pilot areas with continuous flow, WUAs cannot fully embrace their responsibility for
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the operation and maintenance of the canal system until infrastructure improvement
occurs.
While the continuous flow aspect of the WUAs did improve demand-side access
to water in pilot areas, Martin Hvidt identifies several areas where continuous flow could
be harmed by the bureaucratic tendencies of the MPWWR. Implementing the continuous
flow aspect of the IIP on a national scale would be extremely expensive as it requires
substantial changes to the existing infrastructure such as the introduction of automatic
gates. If this updated infrastructure were not implemented rapidly, which is likely given
the ineffectiveness of the organization, there would be a preferential allocation of water
to branch canals that could support the flow.183 The IIP effort found that there is a marked
lack of expertise among construction contracts able to work on the canal infrastructure,
making the cost of improvement very high with contracts frequently running their allotted
time by over by a year or more.184 During summer months when water is more scare, the
MPWWR employees in charge of allocation may be influenced by large and influential
farmers who “are very outspoken when it comes to obtaining their allocated share – and
if possible a larger share – of the available water.”185 This is especially relevant given the
organization’s tendency to engage in patronage. If the engineer in charge of
implementing the continuous flow is coerced by these powerful farmers, then other canal
branches will receive less water. Due to a lack of administrative supervision within
MPWWR, the gate keepers have significant amounts of freedom when deciding how to
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allocate the water and can often earn supplemental income by accepting bribes.186 Given
the corrupt tendencies of the MPWWR and its lack of regulation of its low level staff
members, the progress achieved through these IIP pilot programs are in danger of being
nullified due to the inadequacies of this organization. This administrative corruption
would be irrelevant if this power were awarded to WUAs with supervision by an
independent IAS and run by community members with an incentive to equitably allocate
water.
This prototype has been referred to as “revolutionary in the Egyptian context” for
its potential to increase crop yield, reduce the time needed to irrigate one hectare, and
decrease labor costs; however, it has been demonstrated that these efforts are
inadequate.187 It is helpful to consider modifications that can be made to these pilot
programs to make WUAs more effective as they are not impossible to overcome. It is
also beneficial to briefly look at other aspects of Egypt’s irrigation and agricultural
systems that can be improved on a more macro level.

X.

Policy Considerations

a. Macro- Level Improvements
i. Abandon Reclamation Programs
It cannot be the policy of the Egyptian government to promote the irrigation of
desert land to grow food and create incentives for relocation to reduce population density
in the Nile Basin. While the Nile Delta is a highly productive agricultural region, the
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Sinai Peninsula and the southern desert do not possess inherently fertile soils.188 The New
Valley project alone is expected to claim as much as 5 bcm per year of the Nile’s water
and will require between $60-90 billion to support agriculture, industry and tourism in the
region over the next 20-30 years.189 Academics are asking serious questions about
whether these projects will “increase or decrease the net social benefits generated with
Nile River water” as it has been proven that water is more productive and delivery costs
are much cheaper in the Nile Delta than the Sinai Peninsula.190 Wichelns conducts a
regression analysis to determine which land produces the largest economic return for its
share of the Nile. He argues that an cost-benefit analysis of these reclamation projects
must include competing demands for limited capital and water, and Egypt’s growing
unemployment problem.191 He concludes that “public and private investments in new
production and processing activities in the Nile Valley and Delta may generate net social
benefits more quickly and in greater magnitude than projects in the northern Sinai and
southern desert.”192 Therefore, the Egyptian government must refrain from purposely
diverting precious water to sub-optimal agriculture areas; instead they should consider
other methods of attaining food security such as improved use of water and selection of
crops, and should mechanisms for reducing population growth and density such as family
planning or increased birth control access. Waterbury suggests an alternative solution. He
argues that a more logical solution for Egypt is an increase in its import of grain. He
explains that Egypt is the riparian state that is in the best position to pursue this option to
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increase food security given their “stronger, more diversified economy and better
infrastructure.”193 The country already imports 60 percent of its food and international
food prices rose 37 percent from 2008 to 2010; however, trade-based solutions must be
considered as the country’s poorest are feeling the effects of this price increases, and the
inevitable decrease in the volume of subsidized food.194

ii. Strengthen Informational Linkages Between Local Users and Government
The last national census of agricultural activity was completed in 1961. The exact
area of unused arable and cultivated land is unknown. An effective system to determine
community water systems does not exist. Given Egypt’s limited water resources, this type
of informational gap is unacceptable. The government must be able to identify the land
and crops that are most suitable for a specific area, and provide incentives for farmers to
heed its advice. Additionally, a priority system must be established for allocation to the
various communities, and water quality standards must be implemented and maintained
to prevent the excessive pollution of canals. This type of information will require
cooperation between the federal government and the local WUAs to gather information
on cropping patterns and determine whether these current allocations are sustainable and
efficient.
iii. Methods to Increase Nile Discharge
As discussed above, if collective action between the riparian states can be achieved, it is
important to consider the additional discharge that can be utilized through joint
development projects. Primarily, the feasibility of the Jonglei Canal project should be
193
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reassessed and less arid locations should be considered as alternative to the Aswan High
Dam.

b. Micro-Level Improvements
i. Reduced Role of MPWWE and Further Autonomy to the WUAs
Egypt must follow in Mexico’s footsteps and significantly reduce the role and
power of the MPWWE in water allocation. Although the MPWWE could be especially
effective at gathering information from various communities to develop nation-wide
strategies, local leaders within the WUAs should be responsible for the equitable
allocation of water to various canals. If local community members are forced to continue
consulting with the MPWWE over shortages, quality, pricing, etc., there is no
accountability. If there is distributional autonomy, the WUA has incentives to modify its
behavior as there is transparency and accountability at the local level. As Mahmoud
Moustafa points out, “instead of rights to property, [the Egyptian] government… [is]
trying to transfer responsibility for the property, while retaining fundamental ownership
rights.”195 The strengthening of local property rights within WUAs, as exemplified by the
Mexican case, is essential to create incentives for farmers to manage their allocation of
water responsibly and invest in the expensive infrastructure improvements necessary to
implement continuous flow. If the government could gather enough information about the
water need of each area and divide communities into clearly defined units, it could
provide each area with a specific quota of water based on need and as a percentage of a
sustainable national usage. The community would have clear and undeniable property
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rights to this amount of water. It would then be up to the local community to devise a
system of distribution, perhaps based on historic productivity, plot size or general need,
and levy fees for this water. This money would cover the operating costs of the local
organization and pay for the maintenance of the local infrastructure. The government
would have to ensure that the proper legal framework exists to settle disputes and ensure
the strength of these property rights. Given the similarities between the two countries in
terms of demographics, cultivated lands and characteristics of the irrigation systems,
Egypt should be able to implement reforms with similar success to Mexico.
ii. What is Water Worth?
As of now, irrigation water is largely managed as a free resource with guaranteed
access rights which has led to inefficient water allocation and practices. There is currently
disequilibrium between supply and demand, and government subsidization significantly
contributes to over use. It is essential for Egypt to treat water as an economic good with,
as Doss and Milne point out, “prices based on supply and demand rather than a
subsidized administered price or, no price at all.”196 Water allocation and pricing must
reflect the scarcity of the good in order to address supply problems. It is necessary for
the WUAs to estimate the value of water, the opportunity cost of its depletion, and the
operation and management costs incurred; this price can be reflected in the price charged
to the residents.197 This economic analysis must be conducted in conjunction with the
national government. If water can be priced and allocated through a private market, then
inefficient use at the local level will be greatly reduced.
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Additionally, an effective market and price for water will decrease the likelihood
of farmers growing water-intensive crops. Based on national averages, the production of
rice, sugar cane and fruits, which are grown abundantly in Egypt, have the three highest
water consumption figures per hectare of crops.198 After Egypt altered its planned
agriculture sector in favor of a more liberal decision-making process, many cotton and
maize farmers switched to rice production for its higher profitability; this resulted in
amount of land used for rice production doubling. Doss and Milne show that the
irrigation of more than approximately 500,000 hectares of rice would use 20 percent of
Egypt’s Nile water.199 For both the purposes of decreasing water usage and increasing
food security, the continued use of water to grow these water-intensive species is
unsustainable and does not maximize land productivity. If a water pricing and quota
system were implemented, it is likely that farmers will shift away from these species
because they will be unable to afford the water to maintain them. However, if this
reduction is not sufficient, the government may have to return to centrally-planned
agricultural quotas and restrictions.
iii. Invest in Modernizing Canal Infrastructure
In order to replicate the continuous flow mechanism which is essential to the
success of the IIP effort, there must be a series of improvements to the canal
infrastructure. This will include the installation of automatic downstream control gates to
correctly allocate water from the AHD to various canals. Additionally, as Hvidt explains,
a significant majority of the current canals must be “redug and downsized, improvements
in earthwork must be undertaken and all new mesqua intakes must be reconstructed and
198
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aligned on a standard level.”200While this will inevitably be an expensive undertaking, the
development of uniform canal infrastructure is essential to the long-term reliability and
sustainability of the irrigation sector. Because the government cannot be relied upon to
rapidly and effectively implement these reforms, it is suggested that the IIP should only
work “to plan and facilitate” these efforts and the WUAs should work directly with local,
private firms to organize the design and construction of the mesqua improvements.201
This can paid for, in part, by the fees levied at the local level; however, as discussed, the
success of raising local funds is dependent on the strengthening of property rights. An
effective and modern regulatory system within the canals can significantly reduce
wastage and will allow the government to efficiently manage and monitor output from
the AHD.

XI.

Conclusion
The countries of the Nile Basin are on a collision course that could result in

disastrous military action to determine control. In the wake of the Arab Spring, the
Egyptian government has lost much of the regional clout that allowed it to maintain its
enormous share of the Nile as outlined by the 1959 agreement. Population and economic
growth in upstream countries, specifically Ethiopia, have resulted in intensified calls for a
more equitable water-sharing agreement. However, any water taken by upstream
countries would be a direct reduction in Egypt’s allocation. A 13- year stalemate in the
NBI prompted Ethiopia to begin building the GRD without Egypt’s consent. This dam
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will provide Ethiopia with enormous hydroelectric and irrigation power; however, the
completion of this dam will also result in a certain reduction of the water that reaches
Egypt’s borders. Egypt’s population and agriculture sector rely heavily on the
maintenance of this status quo and also the face the mounting effects of climate change,
rising food prices and immense population growth.
In order to avoid a severe water crisis, Egypt must look to improve efficiency
within its own borders. Primarily this will involve the devolution of power to the local
level through the implementation of WUAs. However, the IIP pilot program that Egypt
implemented did not establish a framework that could plausibly result in the necessary
water-savings. This is due to its failure to reduce the power of the MPWWR and delegate
enough power to the community level the WUAs; the pilot program failed to create
distributional and financial autonomy within the WUAs and they lacked proper
community-wide incentives to reduce water usage. It is essential to take examples from
the successful Mexican irrigation reform efforts and combine these with other
modifications and policy shifts with the agriculture and irrigation sectors in to save
enough water to provide for the growing population in Egypt; these efforts may avoid
shortages when the GRD and other upstream development projects are completed.
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